

To whom it may concern,

I am writing to oppose the land into trust application by the Mashpee Wampanoag for the land in Middleboro Massachusetts for the purpose of building a casino. There must be another meeting scheduled to review the project. The plans were released without sufficient time and without sufficient detail to make any reasonable analysis of the impact of the facility. Each of the first 2 Middleboro/Mashpee IGA agreements were released to the public to review only days before the votes were to have happened. This hearing on environmental concerns follows in that tradition of insufficient information, insufficient time, and insufficient opportunity for public input.

At the town meeting of July 28, 2007, Middleboro voted in article 3 that they did not want a casino. Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Chairman Glenn Marshall stated that the tribe would not come if the community didn't want them. (*Nichols school speech, NECN interview with Chet Curtis*). This was the first of a number of broken promises - promises that were made in public speeches and news reports but not codified in the Middleboro/Mashpee IGA. This was a lie. Glenn Marshall has a proven history of lying and felony convictions. Our negotiations and IGA rely on good faith to cover the inadequate detail in the IGA. Our good faith is based on a **proven liar and felon** who misrepresented himself to the people of Middleboro.

Even the vote to support the agreement in article 2 must be disregarded since much of the benefit was either an exaggeration, wrong, or both. The town was told that the money from that agreement would allow us to restore town jobs and services with the pre-payments provided for in the agreement. (*Middleboro selectman Adam Bond 7/2008*). We found out later that these pre-payments could only be used for casino planning. The annual payments from the agreement have been shown to be insufficient to cover the costs of servicing the facility and its effect on local town government and revenues.

- The Middleboro/Mashpee Inter-Governmental Agreement(IGA) provides insufficient payments to cover the costs of the casino. (*State Treasurer Tim Cahill - Boston Globe 7/26/2007, former Attorney General Scott Harshbarger - Boston Globe 7/26/2007, Umass Professor and gaming expert Clyde Barrows - 6/13/2007, Rep. Tom Calter - 2/25/2008 at Middleboro BOS meeting, Middleboro Selectman Adam Bond - negotiator of the Middleboro/Mashpee IGA at Middleboro BOS meeting 2/26/2008.*)
- Mashpee Wampanoag have no meaningful ties to Middleboro. Tribal Chairman Hendricks said that it was the land and location that brought the tribe. This is reservation shopping pure and simple. Give the Mashpee what they truly deserve under IGRA **a class 2 facility in Mashpee.**(*Sean Hendricks on WBXR 2/2008*)
- Research has shown that Middleboro can expect increases in school enrollments including a significant increase in non-english speaking students. The IGA has no provision for payments to mitigate this effect. Whether the increases are large or small, the IGA should provide for variable payments according to the increases.
- The agreement calls for base payments of \$7M per year. While the agreement provides for increases due to inflation, it only provides for increases due to national inflation not for the higher inflation that is typical in this region. Furthermore, the base figure does not start increasing until the facility opens. This is a fundamental flaw since it may be many years before the casino opens. The supplemental revenue comes from a 4% tax on hotel rooms. This figure is subject to comping and thus is unpredictable and unreliable revenue. At the meeting

where this agreement was presented, the lawyer in charge of the negotiation Dennis Whittlesey assured us that comping was minimal when in fact comp rates run from 50% and more. This shows that our negotiator was uniformed on this point and as a result crafted an agreement that is financially detrimental to the town.(*Whittlesey/Bond 7/2007*)

- Ultimately the IGA provides payments that are about half of what a commercial facility would provide and will not grow at a rate equal to the costs incurred by the town since the costs of the town are tied to the regional inflation rate. This fact alone proves that the facility will adversely effect the financial condition of Middleboro. To make matters worse, area towns are provided no mitigation at all.
- The Middleboro/Mashpee IGA provides insufficient protection against the growth of costs associated with hosting the casino. The IGA provides fixed revenue with no provisions for unpredicted costs. There are no provisions for school growth. There are no provisions for ongoing costs of providing Fire/Police/EMS. The IGA has no provisions for the long term costs of the required infrastructure.(*Rep. Tom Calter at Middleboro BOS meeting 2/26/2008*)
- The Middleboro/Mashpee IGA was signed with the **expectation** that the town would receive more money via a Tribal/State compact. Without a **guarantee** of these expected revenues, the land into trust application must be **denied** due to the fact that the terms specified in the IGA will adversely affect town revenue and tax receipts. This expectation is codified in Section 4 of the Middleboro Mashpee IGA:

The amount of such Payments have been negotiated with the expectation that the Commonwealth will similarly seek payments from the Tribe, and the Town's expectation that the Commonwealth will provide the Town additional mitigation in the form of a percentage of the payments received by the Commonwealth from the Tribe.
- The Middleboro/Mashpee IGA has no provisions for mitigation for negative effects to local real estate values or local business. Then Tribal Chairman, Glenn Marshall, made a presentation in May of 2007 to Middleboro residents which was widely reported in area newspapers. He promised that he would personally reimburse any homeowner or business that was adversely affected by a casino. NONE of these promises were codified in the Middleboro/Mashpee IGA - yet contributed greatly to the town's decision to accept the IGA.(*Glenn Marshall speaking at the Nichols School in Middleboro 5/2007*)
- Research shows that the introduction of a casino jobs will result in the lost of one or more jobs from the surrounding community for each job introduced. (*Grinols 1994; Grinols and Omorov 1995*). Many of these jobs will be lost in Middleboro restaurants and other businesses that rely on free discretionary dollars. Again, the Middleboro/Mashpee IGA has no provisions to mitigate these costs.
- Research suggests that casinos will produce costs that outweigh the financial benefits and result in costs to area taxpayers. Specifically, research shows that for every dollar generated in taxes, the taxpayers will bear at least 3 dollars in costs(or higher) (*Politzer, Morrow and Leavey 1981; Better Government Association 1992; Florida Budget Office 1994*). These costs to taxpayers are reflected in infrastructure costs, regulatory costs, expenses to the criminal justice system, and large social-welfare costs (*Illinois Governor's Office 1992*). The Middleboro/Mashpee IGA makes no provisions for these effects and costs.

- Taylor, Krepps and Wang(2000) found that Foxwoods-style mega-casinos reduce local government revenues by 7 percent. Similarly, while the introduction of the broader set of Indian casinos (including small rural facilities) corresponded with a 23 percent increase in general merchandise earnings among businesses in a 50-mile radius; commercial casinos reduced such earnings by 13 percent and Foxwoods-style Indian casinos did so by 57 percent. So far studies on mega or large market casinos have shown a severe effect on local and regional tax revenues and local business earnings. Again - the Middleboro/Mashpee IGA is a rushed document that does not account for these likely effects.
- Studies suggest that each pathological gambler creates costs to their employers, state/town government, and most of all their families. These costs have been estimated to run as low as \$3,000 to \$20,000 or more for each pathological gambler. The Middleboro/Mashpee IGA provides just \$20K dollars for mitigation of gambling addiction. !!!!! (*Kindt 1994b, Grinols, IGA*)
- Availability of low-skilled casino jobs will create for some a belief that a college education is not needed to succeed. And while many voted for the agreement based on a perception of increased money for education the funding in "real dollars" has almost uniformly decreased. (*Better Government Association 1992; Clotfelter and Cook 1989*)
- Evidence suggests that small business have disproportionate negative impacts from pathological gambling, and unlike large corporations, they would be less likely to have the asset base necessary to cushion against those negative impacts. Middleboro has mostly small businesses. The IGA provides no consideration for the challenges they will face. (*Maryland Department of Health 1994; Better Government Association 1994*)
- On a regional level, the socioeconomic costs are so large that they tend to dwarf the localized economic positives(*California Governor's Office 1992*). These drains on society could easily translate into a net loss of jobs on a statewide or regional level. Furthermore, it can be argued that the combined economic positives and negatives result in a net negative economic multiplier (*Goodman 1994; Teske and Sur 1991*). This is another place where the IGA fails to provide for the effect of the casino on local tax receipts in the form of lost jobs and increased costs.

Sincerely,

Mark Belanger
29 Moulton Street
Middleboro MA, 02346

References

Alberta Lotteries and Gaming. 1994. Gambling and Problem Gambling in Alberta. Edmonton, Alberta. January.

American Psychiatric Association. 1994. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. ("pathological gambling") Vol. 312.31, pp. 615-618.

Bartlett, John. 1968. Familiar Quotations. 14th. Edition. Boston; Little Brown.

Better Government Association. 1992. Staff White Paper. Casino Gambling in Chicago. Chicago, IL.

California Governor's Office of Planning and Research, 1992. California and Nevada: Subsidy, Monopoly, and Competitive Effects of Legalized Gambling. ES-1. Sacramento, CA: California's Governor's Office. December.

Clotfelter, Charles and Phillip Cook. 1989. Selling Hope, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau for Economic Research, Harvard University Press.

Congressional Hearing, 1994. The National Impact of Casino Gambling Proliferation: Hearing Before the House Committee on Small Business. 103rd Congress, 2nd. Session. Washington, D.C.

Dyckman, Martin. 1994. "Misleading the Public." St. Petersburg Times. November 1, p. A13.

Florida Governor's Office of Planning and Budgeting. 1994. Casinos in Florida: An Analysis of the Economic and Social Impacts. Tallahassee, FL: Florida Governor's Office.

Goodman, Robert. 1994. Legalized Gambling as a Strategy for Economic Development. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Center for Economic Development.

Grinols, Earl. 1994. "Bluff or Winning Hand? Riverboat Gambling and Regional Employment and Unemployment." Illinois Business Review (Spring): 6-11.

Grinols, Earl and J. Omorov. 1995. "Development or Dreamfield Delusions?: Assessing Casino Gambling's Costs and Benefits." University of Illinois, September.

Illinois Governor's Office. 1992. Governor James Edgar, Press Release. "Governor Warns Land-Based Casinos Could Bring Crime Surge as well as Overall Loss of Jobs and State Revenues." September 29 (summarizing several Illinois State reports).

Iowa Department of Human Services. 1995. Gambling and Problem Gambling in Iowa: A Replication Survey. July 28.

Kindt, John. 1995. "U.S. National Security And The Strategic Economic Base: The Business/Economic Impacts Of The Legalization Of Gambling Activities." Saint Louis Law School Journal 39, p. 567.

Kindt, John. 1994a. "The Negative Impacts Of Legalized Gambling On Businesses." University of Miami Business Law Journal 4, p. 93.

Kindt, John. 1994b. "The Economic Impacts Of Legalized Gambling Activities." Drake Law Review 43, pp. 51, 66 n. 119.

Lavelle, Louis. 1994. "Voters Deal Loss to Casinos; Gambling Backers Lose Despite \$16-5 Million Campaign." Tampa Tribune. November 9, pp. 1, 5.

Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Alcohol and Drug Abuse Administration. 1994. Task Force on Gambling Addiction in Maryland. Annapolis, Maryland.

Nelson, Todd. 1993. "S.D. bankruptcies down 5 percent: Judge: Gambling caused most cases." Argus Leader (Sioux Falls, S.D.) January 15, p. 1.

News Leader (Springfield, Missouri). 1995. "Jeff City rejects riverboat gambling approved in '92." November 8, p. 1.

Petroski, William. 1995. "Study: More gamblers in jeopardy." Des Moines Register. August 25, pp. A1, A2.

Politzer, Robert, James Morrow and Sandra Leavey. 1981. Report on the Societal Cost of Pathological Gambling and the Cost-Benefit Effectiveness of Treatment. 5th National Conference on Gambling and Risk Taking.

Teske, Paul and Bela Sur. 1991. "Winners and Losers: Politics, Casino Gambling, and Development in Atlantic City." Policy Studies Review 10 (Spring/ Summer): 130-137.

Simurda, Stephen F. 1994. "When Gambling Comes To Town." Columbia Journalism Review (January-February): 36-38.

Spayd, Liz and Yolanda Woodlee. 1993. "Trade Board Rejects D.C. Casino Plan." Washington Post. September 25, pp. A1, A8.

Thompson, William, Ricardo Gazel, and Dan Rickman 1995. The Economic Impact of Native American Gambling in Wisconsin. Wisconsin Policy Research Institute Report.

U.S. Commission on the Review of the National Policy Toward Gambling. 1976. Gambling in America. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office.

Van Der Slik, Jack. 1990. "Legalized gambling: predatory policy." Illinois Issues (March): 10.

Wartzman, Rick. 1995. "Bayou Backlash: Gambling Is Proving To Be a Poor Wager For State of Louisiana: Business Is Disappointing And an FBI Graft Probe Roils a Jaded Electorate." Wall Street Journal. September 11, p. 1.

Worthington, Rogers. 1995. "Poor get poorer at tribal casinos, says study of Wisconsin 'gamers'." Chicago Tribune. April 11, p. 1.